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It is commonly observed that over time and across societies, women
tend to marry older men. The traditional explanation for this phenomenon
is that wages increase with age and hence older men are more attractive
in the marriage market. This explanation, however, involves an implicit
assumption about female specialization in home production - an assumption
that does not completely hold, especially in modern times.
This paper shows that a marriage market equilibrium where women
marry earlier in life than men can be achieved without making any as-
sumptions about the wage process or gender roles. The only driving force
in this model is the asymmetry in fecundity horizons between men and
women. When the model is calibrated with Census Data, the average age
at ﬁrst marriage and the pattern of the sex ratio of single men to single
women over diﬀerent age groups mimics the patterns observed in developed
countries during the last decade (e.g. France, the U.S. and Sweden).
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11. Introduction
It is commonly observed that, over time and across societies, women tend to marry
older men. In the economics literature, the conventional explanation is that wages
rise with age and hence men, who are the breadwinners in specialized families, are
more attractive to women at older ages. Knowing this, young men will wait for
the better marriage opportunities that come along with higher salaries at older
ages. Historically this rationale played a role. For most of human history gender
specialization in marriage was strong and many models rightfully reﬂected this
strong historical specialization (e.g. Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993).1 However,
with the tremendous rise in the labor force participation of women over the last
four decades and the increasing fraction of families in which women earn more
than men, the compelling nature of the conventional economic argument begins
to break down.
I ft h ec o n v e n t i o n a le c o n o m i ca r g u m e n tw a st h eo n l ye x p l a n a t i o n ,t h er i s ei n
women’s economic independence should have relaxed the necessity of younger
women marrying older men. In fact, between 1960 and 1990, female labor force
participation rose from approximately 35% to approximately 60% (leveling oﬀ in
the 1990’s). During this time the wage gap (adjusting for skills) between women
and men declined. Moreover, by the 1990s more than one-third of dual income
families had women earning more than men.2 However, the age diﬀerence at
marriage between men and women barely moved. According to the US Census,
the diﬀerence in the median age between men and women at ﬁrst marriage was
2.5 years in 1960. Thirty years later, in spite of tremendous social changes the
diﬀerence in the median age at ﬁrst marriage between men and women was still
2.3 years.
The important changes in gender roles observed in the last decades occurred
along side a delay of marriage for both sexes rather than a decrease in the age
diﬀerence at ﬁrst marriage between men and women. This is inconsistent with
the purest version of the conventional economic model and is one reason to revisit
our marriage models. A second reason is that, even when women specialized
in home production, the economic model may not have been as important as has
been suggested. For example, the common occurrence of a young woman marrying
her high school sweetheart who is two years older, seems hard to explain using a
1Ted Bergstrom (1996) recognizes this fact when referring to his own theoretical model of
marriage (Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993)).
2See Winkler (1998)
2purely "gains-from-trade type" argument. With wages continuing to rise steeply
with age among the young it is reasonable that even more gains to trade could
occur if women married even older men. Finally, from a theoretical point of view,
these models implicitly assume the myopia of women, imperfect capital markets
or imperfect information about men’s ability. It seems desirable to understand
whether the age diﬀerence can be derived in a model without these auxiliary
assumptions.
A handful of recent studies investigate a second potentially important factor
leading younger women to marry older men - biology. It is a biological fact that
women are fertile for less of their lives than are men. The consequence of this
asymmetry in the fecundity horizons is that there will always be more fertile men
than fertile women at any given point in time. Thinking of this imbalance as
relative scarcity implies more bargaining power for the sex in short supply (in
this case women) and competition among agents for the sex in abundant supply
(in this case males). When this is true, one way that men may compete for
women is through the resources they can bring to the marriage. When this insight
is added to the upward sloping proﬁle of wages with age, men may rationally
wait to marry to compete better with younger men. (Siow (1998)). While this
argument incorporates biology in a serious way, it is the age-wage proﬁle that
remains the underlying driving force of the market equilibrium. Biology, in this
case, is simply the reason that justiﬁes women as the scarce resource and justiﬁes
women choosing among men according to what they bring to the marriage and
receiving the rent from their scarcity. One question that has not been addressed
is whether the scarcity of fertile women arises in a world where individuals have
rational expectations and are fully aware of the asymmetry between men and
women that Siow describes. The point of departure for this paper is exactly this
question: How does the equilibrium in the marriage market look when both men
and women behave optimally and recognize that men have more time than women
to search for the right mate and still have children?
Even assuming that asymmetric fecundity horizons play an important role
in marriage market behavior, it remains unclear which aspects of the marriage
market equilibrium are due to biology itself and which depend on a wage process
where wages rise with age. The objective of this paper is limited to addressing
the question: What can be explained exclusively by biology? Another reason for
isolating the eﬀects of biology independent of the wage processes is that while the
latter varies considerably across societies, biology varies very little. Therefore,
any prediction gleaned from a model that does not rely on upward sloping wage
3proﬁles is likely more applicable in a variety of social contexts. Furthermore,
this framework does not need any additional assumptions about the perception of
future earnings.
The model developed below is a two-sided general equilibrium search model
where (as in most of the labor-related search literature) men and women are ex
ante homogenous and utility is non-transferable.3 Only after a random meeting do
the man and the woman receive signals about the match quality (match-speciﬁc
heterogeneity). The purpose of the paper is to analyze how the agents’ behavior
and opportunity sets are aﬀected by the asymmetry in the fecundity and (in the
generalized version of this model) life horizons. Therefore, the age heterogeneity
will be the crucial element here.4 In this model utility depends both on the quality
of the match and on the joy derived from having children within marriage5.U n l i k e
most of the previous marriage market literature, neither employment decisions nor
capital accumulation is analyzed here. The total number of single men and women,
and therefore the sex ratio, is determined endogenously in the model.
One of the major ﬁndings of this paper is that biology alone can provide an
alternative explanation of the age diﬀerence between men and women at ﬁrst
marriage. Here, biology has two countervailing eﬀects. First, as in Siow (1998),
when women are young both older men and younger men compete for them making
them scarce and hence raising the minimum acceptable match quality for marriage.
By itself this would tend to make women marry at ages older than men. But
oﬀsetting this, forward-looking women, who know about their shorter fecundity
horizon, reduce their optimal reservation value. The net result for reasonable
parameter values is that, at most ages, women set an optimal reservation value
that is relatively lower than the one a man of the same age sets. Therefore, women
marry relatively younger than men because the biological clock induces them to
accept a lower match quality even in the face of their relative scarcity at a given
point in time. That result diﬀers substantially from previous literature where
relatively scarce fertile women are able to choose from a larger set of fertile men
who "compete" for them. In addition, using the generalized version of the model,
solved numerically, this work is able to quantify the age diﬀerence in marriage,
3Using non-transferable utility is helpful in order to provide a framework that is able to
explain stylized facts about marriage independently of the potential gains of specialization, as
it is common in the literature.
4There is an increasing theoretical literature about ex ante heterogeneous agents (for example
Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2002).
5The underlying assumption here is that people derive more utility from having biological
children than from either having them out of wedlock or through adoption.
4the age composition of single males and females and the pattern of the sex ratio of
singles along the life cycle. One of the features of these results is that a relatively
large diﬀerence in the fecundity horizon (say, 20 years) leads to an age diﬀerence at
ﬁrst marriage that is much smaller (1.5 years). These results are then compared
with Micro census Data for the US and other selected countries, from 1960 to
2000.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the
literature on marriage market models. Section 3 outlines a simple 2-period model
where women are only fertile in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da n dm e ni nb o t hp e r i o d s . T h i s
model is solved analytically and is intended to set the basic conceptual framework
in a simpliﬁed way. Section 4 extends the work by modeling the marriage choice as
a ﬁnite-horizon dynamic programming problem and solving the model numerically
- an extension that generates several stylized facts about marriage. Section 5 is
devoted to comparing the implications of the model with US Census data and with
data of selected countries. Speciﬁcally, it compares the pattern of the sex ratio of
never-married people by age group in a generalized 60-period model (ages 16 to
75) with the census data. It ﬁnds that the pattern generated by the model ﬁts data
on the sex ratio in developed countries better than in developing countries, and
ﬁts better for more recent censuses than in previous decades. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Since the publication of Gary Becker’s ﬁrst paper on marriage (Becker 1973)
there has been growing interest in investigating decisions about marriage as if
they occurred in a market. Becker argues that marriage has many aspects that
are similar to trade of any other good in a market. Marriage is a voluntary
contract between two people, or two families, who believe that they will be better
oﬀ married than remaining single. Further, like buyers and sellers, many men
and women compete to ﬁnd mates. These aspects make marriage amenable to
investigation as voluntary trade in a competitive market.
The compelling logic of this argument has spawned a large volume of research
in both economics and sociology of both a theoretical and empirical nature. Much
of the early literature followed up on Becker’s insight and thought about one per-
son, usually the woman, "purchasing" a mate in the marriage market. In this
literature, women made decisions on marriage based on "meeting" men from the
available pool and choosing whether to marry them or remain single. Men were
passive agents and the bilateral nature of the marriage market was ignored. While
5these models were perhaps unrealistic in construct, they have had a major impact
on the literature and on public policy. One well cited example is the work of Wil-
son and Neckerman (1986) who argue that the rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing
among African-Americans is primarily a result of African-American women in-
creasingly choosing not to marry from a shrinking pool of African-American men
as they are deemed to be of insuﬃcient quality to be "marriageable" (i.e. close to
the women’s age and education level, not in prison and employed).
Investigating this theory, Brien (1997) ﬁnds that while the pool of marriageable
men does aﬀe c tt h ea g ea tﬁrst marriage, this mechanism explains very little of
the diﬀerence in the timing of marriage (and fertility) between African-Americans
and Whites. Other empirical examples where women are seen as choosing from
a pool of available men include Fitzgerald (1991), Lichter et al. (1992), Wood
(1995) and Schmidt (2002).
While empirical work has largely ignored the bilateral nature of marriage,
theoretical work has had a rich tradition of investigating marriage as a bilateral
process (either in a stable matching context (i.e. Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)), or a dynamic search context (i.e. Mortensen (1988)).6
Most of the literature views utility of marriage arising solely from the quality
of the match between the husband and the wife.7 However, clearly one of the
main reasons that marriage occurs is for the production of children. While more
recently, bearing children outside of marriage has become more common in devel-
oped countries, there are still reasons to believe that it is less costly, or of higher
utility for parents to raise a child within marriage. For example, Willis and Weiss
(1993) argue that children are a public good within marriage and as such both
parents can derive utility from the child at the same time while sharing the cost
of raising the child. This advantage is lost when a child’s time needs to be divided
between a custodial and non-custodial parent outside of marriage. In a real sense,
the distinction of utility arising both from the marriage itself as well as from the
children produced by it is unimportant when the marriage market is viewed as
static (as the utility from the marriage can simply be redeﬁned as the marriage’s
intrinsic value plus the expected utility from children produced from it at the time
of marriage). But as we discuss below, when men and women are forward looking,
and when fecundity falls with age, this distinction becomes important.
Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) present a model with incomplete information
6For detailed surveys about the search and matching literature, see Burdett and Coles (1999)
and also Pissarides (2000)
7An exception is Siow (1998).
6where men who expect to be successful delay marriage until they are able to give
a signal that allows them to attract more desirable women. The equilibrium of
this model is that, while all women marry early in life, the most desirable women
marry successful older men and the less desirable women marry young men who
do not expect to prosper.
The interaction between marriage, labor market and human capital accumula-
tion has also been addressed in the literature. Recent examples are Aiyagari et al.
(2000), Seitz (2002) and Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2002). Also, in a recent
paper, Brien, Lillard and Stern (2002) analyze cohabitation before marriage as a
learning process about match quality.
As noted above, Siow (1998) introduced the issue of the shorter fecundity
period of women.8 In a model with capital accumulation and where utility comes
exclusively from having children, old and young men (all fertile) compete for young
women as by assumption infertile women do not participate in the market. Young
men would always marry young women except that Siow allows wages to rise with
age as well. Because of this some old men, those who successfully obtain a higher
wage, are able to marry. This displaces some of the young men in the competition
over scarce fertile women. Moreover, Siow argues that there is a relationship
between the scarcity of fertile women and the fact that men are more likely to
remarry after divorce.9 While it is hard to argue that, at any point of time, the
stock of single fertile women is smaller than the stock of single fertile men, it
is not clear whether this will be true in a dynamic framework. What this paper
shows is that a market with more single men than women could be the equilibrium
outcome where women, aware of their relatively limited fecundity horizon reduce
their reservation value over the quality of a mate in order to ensure they marry
when they are still in their fertile period.
8Tertilt (2002) uses a similar frameworrk to analyze the eﬀects of polyginy.
9As Siow(1998) states in the introduction (pg. 335) ”First, in monogamous societies with
divorce and remarriage, fecund women are relatively scarce. For example, in North America,
at least 30 percent of ﬁrst marriages fail. Twenty percent of divorced women and 60 percent
of divorced men will remarry. This diﬀerential in remarriage rates suggest that 12 percent of
women who marry for the ﬁrst time will marry divorced men. There are at least 12 percent
fewer never-married to match with never-married men. Women will behave diﬀerently than
men in response to this relative scarcity.”
73. A Simple 2-period Model
In this section we develop a simple overlapping generations model where people
live two periods, women are fertile only in the ﬁrst period and men are fertile in
both periods. This simpliﬁcation will allow us to obtain closed form solutions of
the strategies and to prove existence and uniqueness. In the next section we will
generalize this model allowing people to live a larger number of periods, and where
the fecundity horizon for women is shorter than the one for men. The numerical
solution for the generalized model is then compared with census data.
3.1. Assumptions
There is a continuum of single women of measure F(t),a n do fm e n ,M(t).W e
will focus on the steady state, so F(t)=F and M(t)=M.
In the spirit of Pissarides (1990), the number of contacts between single women




where 0 <θ<1 and µ a constant lower than 1.10
Women will meet at most one man per period and vice versa. The probability
of meeting someone of the opposite sex each period will depend the relative scarcity























All singles are ex-ante homogeneous except for their age and potential fecun-
dity. The preferences over the opposite sex are idiosyncratic. As stated above, this
paper focuses in how time aﬀects marriage behavior; therefore this assumption,
along with the one of random matching, are for simplicity and does not aﬀect
generality.
10This constant is merely a time scaling parameter introduced to ensure that the probability
of meeting is lower than 1 and to allow a replication of the model in an arbitrary number of
periods.
8M e na n dw o m e nd i ﬀer in potential fecundity by age. While men are fertile at
all ages, women are only fertile at age 1.
Both men and women live two periods, ages 1 (young) and 2 (old) . At any
moment, there will be a number of women from both generations, f1 of age 1 and
f2 of age 2 looking for a husband. Similarly these women will face a market of m1
(young) and m2 (old) bachelors.
Since men and women get married in pairs we need the number of young and
old women that get married each period (w1 and w2) to be equal to the total of
men (h1 young plus h2 old) who enter into marriage. That is:
w1 + w2 = h1 + h2
Each period, an exogenous ﬂow of single young people of age 1, f1 women
and m1 men (we assume m1 = f1)e n t e rt h em a r k e t . 11 The men and women who
have not married in the previous period will remain in the market. In the steady
state, this ﬂow of young people entering the market will be equal to the number
of people who exit the market through ma r r i a g ea ta n ya g ep l u st h en u m b e rt h a t
die single after period 2 ( fs old maids and msold bachelors).12.T h a ti s ,
f1 = w1 + w2 + f
s
m1 = h1 + h2 + m
s
Since the motivations of an eventual divorce and remarriage could be very
diﬀerent that the ones for ﬁrst marriage, this topic is not investigated in this
paper.13 We assume that people who divorce or whose spouse die do not re-enter
the market. The meaning of this assumption is that, when single, people plan
to marry only once in life. In other words, that at the moment people decide to
marry the ﬁrst time they believe that their marriage will last for the rest of their
lives.
11As in Burdett and Coles (1997).
12Here we implicitly assume that the actual number of children that people have is the quantity
needed to ensure the steady state with no population growth. Since the goal of this paper is to
explain only the decision of marriage we assume the decision about the number of children as
exogenous.
13For a model of marriage with "on the job" search and therefore endogenous separations, see
Cornelius (2003)
9The stock of single female of each age will be
f2 = f1 − w1
f
s = f2 − w2
F = f1 + f2
Similarly, the stock of single men of each age will be
m2 = m1 − h1
m
s = m2 − h2
M = m1 + m2
T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri se q u a lt oβ ∈ (0,1)
The age composition of the marriage market is endogenously determined in








are simultaneously determined as a function of the reservation strategies of men
and women.
3.2. Payoﬀs
Given that a man and a woman meet, their potential payoﬀs come from mutual
compatibility and the utility of having children within marriage. We assume that
both men and women will receive zero utility if they do not marry either in period
one or two.
The speciﬁc utility that a woman receives from a man and vice versa are
considered as independent random draws from the distribution Gm (y) and Gf (x),
respectively. Assume that Gm (y) has support [0,ymax] and mean y, and Gf (x)
has support [0,xmax] and mean x.14 Both distributions are strictly increasing on
x and y respectively.
14In theory, y or x could take on negative values if the mean of both distributions were strictly
positive. It sounds perfectly plausible that any man or woman could ﬁnd that marrying certain
canditates to be worse than staying single, and having children with these potential mates as a
discount over having them out of wedlock. However, since the utility of being single is equal to
0, the reservation values set by men and women will be always nonnegative and that assumption
will become irrelevant.
10In addition, if a fertile man and a fertile woman meet, the utility is increased
by a multiplicative parameter k>1 because of the possibility of having children
together. For example, if a fertile man marries a fertile woman he will receive kx
per period and she will receive ky per period. If either the man or the woman
involved is infertile, both of them will only receive x or y respectively, that is, only
the love of the other person.
The rationale for the parameter k is that the value of a "having a family"
will be a function of the attraction to their signiﬁcant other. That is, people
enjoy having children more with a person they care about. If we assume that
people always receive utility from having children, we can separate it into two
components, one coming from parenthood, and the other component coming from
who the agent are having children with. Since it is possible to have children
without a stable relationship, the speciﬁcj o yo fh a v i n gc h i l d r e n( a n dt h u st h e
utility out-of-wedlock parenthood) is normalized to 0 in this model. We assume
further that the multiplicative parameter k has a maximum such that the utility
o fm a r r y i n ga n dh a v ec h i l d r e nw i t ha na v e r a g ep e r s o nc a nn o tb eh i g h e rt h a nt h e
joy of ﬁnding a perfect match. That is,
kx ≤ xmax and ky ≤ ymax (5)
Thus, the payoﬀso fm a r r i a g ef o rm e na n dw o m e na r et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Women Husband Age 1 Husband Age 2
Marry at age 1 ky(1 + β) ky
Marry at age 2 y
Men Wife Age 1 Wife Age 2
Marry at age 1 kx(1 + β) x
Marry at age 2 kx x
3.3. The Man’s Optimization Problem15
3.3.1. Probability of a Marriage Oﬀer for Men
Let us ﬁr s ta n a l y z et h eM a l eP r o b l e m .I ne a c hp e r i o dam a nw i l lm e e taw o m a n
with probability ηm (by Equation (3)). The man will meet a single young woman
15Unless note otherwise I use the term man and woman in this Section to refer to single man
and single woman.
11with probability p.This probability is equal to
f1
F (the fraction of single women
who are young), and this fraction (while endogenous to the market) is exogenous
to each individual. However, the fact that he meets a young woman does not
mean that he has a concrete opportunity to marry her. Even though all men are
fertile, a given young woman will not be indiﬀerent between a man of age 1 and
of age 2, because if she marries a senior bachelor she will enjoy his company for
only one period. Hence she will set two diﬀerent reservation values, Rf for young
men and R
f
old for men of age 2. In other words, a senior bachelor will have a
probability of a marriage oﬀer from a young woman (that is, to meet and also

























Since old women will have reservation utility equal to 0 , they will accept any




m (1 − p)
Given that a marriage oﬀer is available, the man receives a signal drawn from
the distribution Gf(x) and decide to marry or not.
3.3.2. Utility of Marriage for Men of Age 2 (Old)
Old men who do not marry will die single, earning zero utility. The reservation
value for an old man is therefore equal to 0. He would be willing to marry any
woman who makes him a marriage oﬀer. If he meets a woman age 2 (who also
has a reservation utility equal to 0), they will marry with certainty. If he meets a
young woman (age 1) and he marries her, he will enjoy the extra utility from the
prospect of having children (k times the type of the woman).









2 k + α
old¢
x (6)
123.3.3. Utility of Marriage for Men of Age 1 (Young)
Since young men are able to wait until they are old in order to ﬁnd the right mate,
in period 1 men set a reservation value for accepting a woman taking into account
next period prospects. As before, they can meet young or old women. Of course,
if a young man marry a young woman, he will enjoy having children and live with
his wife for two periods. If he marries an old woman he will be married for only
one period and without children. Consequently, the reservation values of match
quality a young man will set for marrying a young or an old woman will not be
the same. Call these two reservation values Rmand Rm
old, respectively. Moreover,






. The utility that a man derives from marrying at














3.3.4. Optimization Problem for Young Men




1 +( 1− φ1)βU
m
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1 if x ≥ Rm or x ≥ Rm
old
0 otherwise
here Dm is the decision of marrying at at age 1 and
φ1 = α
young
1 (1 − Gf (R
m)) + α
old (1 − Gf (R
m
old)) (8)
is the probability that a man marries at age 1 with a young or an old woman.
The reservation value set for an old woman is exactly equal to the discounted
v a l u et h a tam a nh a si fr e m a i n si nt h em a r k e ta ta g e2 .N o t i c et h a t ,t h et ot h e
13linearity assumed in the utility function, the reservation value that men set for
older women is k(1+β) times the reservation value for young women. The reason
for this is if he marries an old woman he will live with his wife only one period












2 = k(1 + β)R
m
3.4. The Woman’s Optimization Problem
3.4.1. Probability of a Marriage Oﬀer for Women
Now we can analyze the female problem. In each period , given the probability
of meeting rate ηf (by Equation (2)), a given woman will meet a young man with
probability q a n da no l dm a nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y (1 − q) . She will marry him if
the utility of marrying the man she meets, drawn from the distribution Gm(y) is
greater than the value of search for a better mate for one more period.
3.4.2. Utility of Marriage for Women of Age 2 (Old)
A woman is age 2 knows two things: ﬁr s t ,s h ew i l ld i ea tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,
and therefore her reservation value will be =0 ;second, she is not fertile. This
means that she will not receive the extra utility of having children, nor will she
be able to provide that extra utility to any man she marries.
We can deﬁne the oﬀer rates that a senior woman faces in the following way.
A woman will meet a man each period with probability ηf. If she happen to meet
an old man (with probability (1 − q)) he will propose with probability 1, and so




If she meets a young man (with probability q) she will only marry him if her type
x is as least as large as his reservation utility for a senior bachelorette, Rm
old. For
that reason, the probability that a young man proposes to a senior woman will
be (1 − Gf (Rm
old)),what means that a senior bachelorette will receive a proposal
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3.4.3. Utility of Marriage for Women of Age 1 (Young)
A young woman sets a reservation value taking into account that she may have
future opportunities to ﬁnd a better spouse. However, if she doesn’t marry young
s h ew i l ln o tb ea b l et oh a v ec h i l d r e n .E v e nt h o u g hm e no fa l la g e sa r ef e r t i l e ,a
young woman will not be indiﬀerent between marrying a young man or an old
man of the same match quality because a marriage with the old man lasts only
for one period. Of course, while any old man will accept her, she will only be
able to marry a young man if her match quality is higher than the reservation
value set by him,R m. Ay o u n gm a np r o p o s e st oay o u n gw o m a nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
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3.4.4. Optimization Problem for Young Women
Hence, the problem facing a young woman is to choose to marry or not at Age 1
in order to maximize
U
f
1 +( 1− γ1)βV
f
2






































15is the probability that a woman marries at age 1.
The reservation value set for an old man is equal to the discounted value that
a woman has if remains in the market at age 2 divided by k. Since men are fertile
at all ages, if a woman marry at age 1 will have children with probability one, but
if she waits until the second period she will not be able to bear children. Notice
that, because all men are fertile, the reservation value that men set for older men

















3.5. Steady State Equilibrium
3.5.1. Reaction Functions
Solving the problems stated in Equations (7) and (9), the reaction functions for










































Clearly, the higher a young man’s reservation value, the greater the probability
that he will still be in the market when old. Therefore, the higher the probability
of being accepted by a women when he is older, the higher the minimum match
quality he requires when young.
For women, the intuition is as follows. The reservation value of a woman
depends positively on the average "match quality" of the available men, the degree
of patience and the meeting rate. Women will decrease their reservation value the
higher the value of having children and the higher the reservation value that
men set for older women, times the fraction of young men in the market. The
16explanation for this last factor is the following: the more choosy are young men
about old women (and the greater the fraction of young men in the market),
the larger the incentives of young women to worry about their future and marry
young.
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The following theorem establishes that there exists a unique solution system
formed by Equations (11) and (12) and hence, there exists a unique steady state
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Assume that Gf (x) and Gm(y) have the same support [0,xmax].
Assume further that there exists a constant C< 1
xysuch that the distributions’








for all x ∈ [0,xmax]. Then there exists a unique equilibrium for the system formed
by equations (11) and (12). This equilibrium will be an interior solution, that is,
both men and women will marry either at age 1 or 2 with positive probability.
Outline of Proof. Deﬁne
H (x)=T1 (T2 (x)) (16)
In Equations (14) and (15) we show that every steady state equilibrium of the
model corresponds to a ﬁxed point of H (.). A long calculation, relegated to the
Appendix, shows that under the hypothesis of the theorem
| H
0 (x) |< 1
17Consequently, H (x) is a contraction mapping.
By the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique ﬁxed point of H (.).
Call it Rm
old. A short argument in the Appendix shows that Rm
old ∈ [0,xmax), and
the associated R
f
old ∈ [0,xmax), and that the uniqueness is ensured for Rm and
Rf. We conclude that the unique ﬁxed point of H (.) corresponds to a steady state
equilibrium of the model.
Remark 2. The hypothesis of Theorem 1 is trivially satisﬁed if Gf (x) and Gm(y)
are uniformly distributed with support [0,1]
Proposition 3. Assume that the distributions of men and women are equal.
Provided that people derive utility for having children within marriage (k>1),
then men will be choosier than women, that is, Rm >R f .
Proof. See Appendix
3.5.2. Stock of Singles in the Market
Given the existence of an equilibrium, we can characterize the steady state number
of single men and women using equations (2), (3), (8),(10), (11) and (12).T h e
number of man and women that marry at the young age is
h1 = m1φ1 (17)
w1 = f1γ1 (18)
respectively, leaving the number of remaining (old) singles in the market as
m2 = m1 − h1 = m1 (1 − φ1) (19)
f2 = f1 − v1 = f1 (1 − γ1) (20)















the number of people who marry when old are
h2 = m2φ2 = m1 (1 − φ1)φ2
w2 = f2γ2 = f1 (1 − γ1)γ2
183.6. Example: Uniform Distribution
In order to gain further intuition on the model, in this section we will solve the
model assuming that the distribution of men and women of ages 1 or 2 is uniform
with support [0,1]. That is:
Gf(x)=Gm(y) ∼ U [0,1]



































fβ [2 − qη









fβ [2 − qη
mβ (1 + p(k − 1))]
Equations (19) and (20) can be solved numerically in order to ﬁnd the steady
state equilibrium of the model. Figure 1 show the equilibrium values of selected
variables as a function of k ∈ [1,2], considering the following values for the para-
meters:
θ =0 .5 β =0 .9 µ =0 .9 m1 = f1 =1 0 0
Figure 1 shows how the reservation values of men and women, the fraction of
single men (women) who are young, the probability of marriage at Age 1 and the
ratio Single Men/Single Women change with the value of children (k). As shown,
the higher the increase in the utility of marriage for having children, the lower
the reservation values for women, and the higher the probability that a woman
marry young. Because women marry younger, the fraction of young women over
the total of single women is increasing with k. On the other hand, men’s behavior
is the opposite to the one of women but the patterns seem to be relatively more
stable. Therefore, the predictions of this simple 2-period model are the following:
• The higher the value of having children within marriage, women tend to
marry younger and men older. For that reason, the age diﬀerence in marriage







































































































Figure 1: Equilibrium of the 2 Period Model for Diﬀerent Values of k.T o p :
(a) Reservation Values, (b) Fraction of Young Men and Women, Bottom: (c)
Probability of Marriage at Age 1, (d) Ratio Single Men/Single Women
• S i n g l ew o m e ni nt h em a r r i a g em a r k e ttend to be younger than single men.
T h a ti s ,ag i v e nm a ni sm o r el i k e l yt om e e tay o u n gw o m a nt h a ni saw o m a n
to meet a young man.
• As their reservation values decrease with higher values of k, match qualities
for women also tend to decrease.
4. A Generalized Model
In this section we extend the simple two period model to a more general ﬁnite
horizon model. This general model is solved numerically. The following are the
modiﬁed assumptions:
20B o t hm e na n dw o m e nl i v eT periods. Women are fertile for L periods, men are
fertile for N periods, with L ≤ N ≤ T. While women’s fecundity decrease linearly
form period L1 to L, men keep their full fecundity until they lose it completely at
period N.
As in the two period model above, women will meet at most one man per
period and vice versa. The probability of meeting is determined by equations (2)
and (3).
As before, an exogenous ﬂow of single young people of age 1, f1 women and
m1 men enter the market each period and the men and women who do not marry
will remain in the market. Hence, the total number of single women and men will



















which are endogenously determined.
We redeﬁne the extra utility for having children for a man who marries at age








k if j ≤ N and i ≤ L1
k −
(k−1)(i−L1)
(L+1−L1) if L1 <i≤ L and j ≤ N
1 otherwise







k if i ≤ L1 and j ≤ N
k −
(k−1)(i−L1)
(L+1−L1) if L1 <i≤ L and j ≤ N
1 otherwise
21where k>1 and is subject to the condition established in (5).
G i v e nt h a tt h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d sw i l lb el a r g ee n o u g hi no r d e rt oc a l i b r a t e
the results of the model with census data by age, it will be convenient to relax the
assumption that people die only in the last period. For that reason we introduce a
probability of dying each period that depends on the agent’s age. The probability
o fd y i n gi nag i v e np e r i o df o rw o m e na n dm e no fa g e si,j will be
d
m
j for a man of age j<T
d
f






In the same way, the probability of that the marriage ends in a given period






















The characteristics of the utility functions for men and women remain as in
t h em o d e lo ft h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .
4.1. The Man’s Optimization Problem
Each period a man of age j will meet a woman of age i with probability ηmpi
(by equations (3) and (21)). The probability of being accepted by that woman
depends on the age of both the man and the woman. A man of age j will receive










i,j will be the reservation value that a woman of age i set for a man of
age j.
Then the probability that a man of age j has a concrete concrete opportunity















224.1.1. Expected Utility of Marrying at age j
The expected utility that a man of age j derives from marrying a woman of age i
depends on both the man’s age and the woman’s age. This occurs not only because
fecundity matters, but also because the age of each partner will determine how
long they will enjoy each other company. Consider ﬁrst a man of age j where
j ≤ L1 (a fertile man such that a woman of the same age is still completely
fertile). In this case he will be indiﬀerent between any woman his age or younger
because he will spend with her the rest of his life. If he marries an older woman,
he will survive her and receive zero utility from the moment he become a widower
until his own death. The case of an infertile (j>N ) man is similar, because the
only utility of marriage is derived from the quality of the match and the length
o ft h em a r r i a g e .I nt h ec a s et h a tL1 <j≤ N (a fertile man who is older than the
age at which women start losing fecundity), a man will not be indiﬀerent between
any woman younger than himself because he will receive extra utility from a fully
fertile spouse. Therefore, the expected utility of a man of age j who marries a
woman of age i will be the discounted sum of the ﬂows of expected payoﬀso f














Given that the probability of a marriage oﬀer from women of diﬀerent ages























4.1.2. Probabilities of Marriage for Men

















(1 − φt) (27)
4.1.3. Objective Function for Men
Given Equations (25) and (26), the objective function for any man at a given age
























































j is the decision of marrying at age j with a woman of age i.
4.1.4. Men’s Reservation Values















j+1 if 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1
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if 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1
0 if j = T
244.1.5. Stocks of Single and Married Males
The stocks of singles of age j will be equal to the surviving singles of age j − 1










Similarly to the 2-period Model (see Equation (17)), the total men who marry
at age j will be
hj = mjφj
and the stock of married men of age j will be the sum of the surviving males who










4.2. The Woman’s Optimization Problem
Each period a woman of age i will meet a man of age j with probability ηfqj
(by Equations(2) and (22)). As above, the probability of being accepted by that
bachelor will depend on the age of both of the woman and the man she meet. The









j,i will be the reservation value that a man of age j set for a woman of
age i.















254.2.1. Expected Utility of Marrying at age i
In the same way as for men, the expected utility that a woman of age i derives







































4.2.2. Probabilities of Marriage for Women
























4.2.3. Objective Function for Women


























































i is the decision of marrying at age i with a man of age j.
4.2.4. Reservation Values for Women
















i+1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1
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i+1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1
0 if i = T
4.2.5. Stocks of Single and Married Females











The total of women who marry at age j will be
wi = fiγi














Now we can solve numerically the system formed by Equations (28), (29), (35)
and (36). The distribution functions Gf (x) and Gm (y) are both uniform with
support [0,1] and the values given to the parameters will be the following16:
T =6 0(75 years old) N =4 5(60 years old)
L1 =2 0 (35 years old) L =3 0 (46 years old)
µ =0 .9 k =1 .3
β =0 .915 θ =0 .5
m1 =1 0 0 f1 =1 0 0
4.3.1. Reservation Values and Marriage Oﬀers
Figure 2 shows the reservation values for men and women with respect to people of
the opposite sex of the same age and Figure 3 shows the probability of receiving
a marriage oﬀer at each age (by Equations (23) and (31)). Interpreting both
graphics will help to summarize several of the predictions of the model about
marriage behavior.
As shown in Figure 2, women younger than age 34 set a higher reservation
value than men of the same age. The reason for this is the traditional one: fertile
women are outnumbered by fertile men. As in Siow (1998), a young woman faces
relatively better market conditions than a man of her age. This is what has been
emphasized by the literature. In principle there is a counter balancing force
lowering the reservation values of women that is their relatively shorter fecundity
horizon. However, for women in their late teens or early twenties the distant end
of their fecundity years is suﬃciently removed that the better marriage market
conditions for women are large enough to make them more choosy than men.
When the decline in fecundity is nearer, the reservation values of women start
to decrease sharply. In this example we assume that fecundity start to decline
at age 36, and this causes the reservation value to start to decrease in the mid






























Figure 2: Reservation Values for Potential Spouses of the Same Age
twenties and continue through the end of their fertile years. Note that after
fecundity ends, reservation values continue to decline. This however is driven by
mortality as the shorter life expectancy is cause fewer chances to marry
The behavior of men is diﬀerent than the one of women. The reservation value
for men younger than age 34 is ﬂat and lower than the one for women because, as
stated above, fertile men outnumber fertile women. When women’s fecundity start
to decline around 35 years old, men of the same age raise their reservation value
for those women in light of their increasing probability of being barren. Around
age 50, the reservation values for men decrease sharply in light of the foreseeable
loss of fecundity (in this example at age 60).
The behavior of men and women in this general model can be compared to
the results established in the 2-period model. One of the principal results of the
model was that women (in period 1) set a reservation value lower than the one
set by men. This is because the 2-period model does not give women suﬃcient
distance from the end of fecundity to take advantage of their relative scarcity at
ap o i n ti nt i m e .
Figure 3 reﬂects how reservation values of men and women aﬀect the oppor-





























Figure 3: Probability of Receiving a Marriage Oﬀer for Men (αj) and Women (λi)
receiving a marriage oﬀer drops when they are in their middle 30’s (when fecundity
starts to decline). Note that oﬀers start to decline later than when reservation
values begin to decline (at age 25). The reason for this is that the decline in oﬀers
from men to women is a function of men’s reservation values. Women who are
younger than 35 remain completely acceptable to men as they are still completely
fertile. This occurs for two important but diﬀerent reasons. First, women worry
about their own ability to bare children and the utility they will receive for this.
Second, women rationally anticipate their worsening position in the marriage mar-
ket knowing that men will begin increasing their reservation value for women over
35 as younger women will remain as a viable substitute. For men, the probability
of receiving a marriage oﬀer decreases at an increasing rate between ages 35 and
60.
4.3.2. Hazard Rates
Figure 4 shows the hazard rates of marriage for men and women at each age.
Observe that there is a sharp increase in the probability that single women marry
from their late 20’s to their middle 30’s. That increase is due to lower women’s
30reservation values as the decline in fecundity is approaching. Assuming that fe-
cundity starts to decline at age 35, the ﬁgure shows how the hazard rate for women
increase at a diminishing rate from 35 to 40 and then decrease trough the end of
her life. As women’s fecundity declines, men are more reluctant to marry them
due to the increasing risk of not having a child (observe in Figure 2 how men
from 35 to 46 increase their reservation value for women of the same age). When
women lose fecundity completely (here at age 47), notice the kink in the hazard
rate curve. The explanation for this is that a new market appears: infertile women
are now much less choosy about marrying infertile men.
The pattern of the hazard rates for men is similar to that of women, but
the timing is diﬀerent. As the reservation values of men decrease with time, their
hazard rates for marriage are increasing through their fertile period (until 60 years
old).Thereafter the reservation values decrease sharply. Then, as infertile women
become acceptable, the drop stops to then continue as a slower pace during the









































4.3.3. Stocks of Men and Women by Marital Status
31Figure 5 shows the stocks of single men, single women, married men (by Equation
(30)) and married women (Equation (37)) at each age. The actual pattern of
the 2000 US census data (whites) is displayed in Figure 6. Note that single men
outnumber single women from their early 20’s until near age 60, and that the
number of married women is greater than the number of married men in most of
the life cycle. The reason for this is that, since more women marry at a young age,
this aﬀects the stocks of people of all ages. One interesting feature of the model is
that by age 55 the sex ratio of married men to married women approaches one, but
before reaching parity the number of married men starts to decline more quickly
than the number of married women. because men marry later than women, for
to attain parity with women there must be ages at which men marry with higher
probability than women. This does occur (after age 42) but the higher mortality
rates of men oﬀset the higher marriage rates leaving the stock of married women


































































Figure 6: Stock of Single and Ever Married Men and Women in US Census 2000
(Whites - 5% Sample)
4.3.4. Comparative Statics
This model has two key parameters -the value of having children within marriage,
k and the discount factor, β.Here we analyze how do the model predictions change
with changes in these parameters. Figures 7 and 8 the comparative statics results
on k while Figures 9 and 10 show results for β.T a k e e x a m p l e f o r k =1 .1, a
low premium for having children within marriage; in this case we have that men
marry at age 28 and women at 27.5. The pattern of the sex ratio is almost ﬂat,
with a small increase during the period of declining fecundity and then a more
pronounced decline from mid 50’s (due to higher male mortality rates). That is,
if having children does not play a big role in the decision of marriage, the age
diﬀerence tend to disappear, and the sex ratio of singles diﬀers from parity only
because diﬀerential mortality of men and women. As the value of having a family
increases, men marry at older ages and women at younger ages. This causes the
sex ratio to have an inverted U-shape that peaks during the decline in women’s
fecundity. One interesting case is what happen when k =1 . A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e
7, men marry on average younger than women. The sex ratio of singles is then















k=1 k=1.1 k=1.3 k= 1.5 k= 1.8 k=2
Men
Women
Figure 7: Average Age at Marriage for Diﬀerent Values of k (β =0 .91)
causes the sex ratio to diﬀer from parity and cause any age diﬀerence at marriage
between men and women. The higher male mortality causes a scarcity of men
increasing the probability of an oﬀer per period and improving their marriage
prospects. Given that this solution is calculated with the mortality rates for
whites in the U.S. in 1995, an even greater imbalance in young mortality between
men and women (for example Blacks in the U.S.) could have a big eﬀect on the
composition of the marriage market and age at marriage for men and women.
Figures 9 and 10 show the age at marriage and the pattern of the sex ratio for
singles at diﬀerent values of β. As one can imagine, people tend to marry later
when they are more patient (higher levels of β). Also, as shown in Figure 10, the
sex ratio tends to be ﬂatter for levels of β within the usual range (0.90 to 0.99).
However, what is striking is what happen at high discount rates (say β =0 .85).
Here again men marry younger than women and the sex ratio is decreasing at
all ages. When people discount future utility heavily enough, the diﬀerential
mortality rates between men and women, even when very small, cause men to
















































β= 0.85 β= 0.89 β= 0.91 β= 0.95 β= 0.99
Men
Women
















Figure 10: Ratio Single Men/Single Women by Age for Diﬀerent Levels of β
(k =1 .3)
5. Comparison with Census Data
5.1. US Census 2000
In order to compare the model results with US Census data two sources of data
are used. The data on age at ﬁrst marriage is from the 1995 Marriage Detail File
(MDF) of the U.S. Vital Statistics Registry.17 For all other statistics the data
is from the 2000 IPUMS 5% data. People in institutions are excluded from the
sample, and the analysis is limited to people born in the US. Despite pooling
across cohorts, the fact that most marriages occur by age 40 minimizes that prob-
lem. Of particular interest is the diﬀerent marriage markets for White and Black
Americans. Therefore a separate analysis is conducted for Blacks and Whites.
17The Marriage Detail File has not been released since 1995 and is the closest data to the U.S
Census 2000. The Census stopped asking age at ﬁrst marriage in 1980.
365.1.1. Whites
Figure 11 and Table 1 show a comparison between the model results and the data
when β =0 .91 and k =1 .3. The model predicts men and women marrying later
(men at age 27.9 and women at 26.3 years old compared with the actual 26.3
and 25.2 respectively). Also the model suggests a smaller age diﬀerence at ﬁrst
marriage (1.1 year versus 1.6 years in the data). Table 1 also displays a comparison
between the model and the census data and MDF for the average age of singles
and ever married, the ratio single men/single women, the fraction of ever married
and widows/ers (only widows in the model) and the sex ratio of ever married.
Figure 11 shows the pattern of the sex ratio by age for singles and ever married.
Observe that the ratio single male/single female peaks at around age 40 in the

























single sex ratio (model)
single sex ratio (US 2000)
ever married sex ratio (model)
ever married sex ratio (US 2000)
Figure 11: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. US Census 2000 (Whites) and
Model (k =1 .3,β=0 .91) with mortality rates for whites.
5.1.2. Blacks
Figure 12 and Table 2 show a comparison between the model results and the
census data when β =0 .93 and k =1 .08. This value of k implies a low premium
37Model US 2000
(1) (2)
M e nW o m e nM e nW o m e n
β 0.91
k 1.30
Age of First Marriage 27.9 26.4 26.3 25.2
Average Age of Singles 28.0 26.4 27.9 27.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.08 1.25
Ever Married (%) 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.79
Fraction of Singles 45 and Over 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.08 0.01 0.06
Average Age of Ever Married 48.9 49.2 47.8 47.4
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.92 0.90
Total Sex Ratio 0.96 0.97
Table 1: Comparison Between Model and US Census 2000 (Whites)
for having children within marriage (k =1would imply people is indiﬀerent with
respect of having children out of wedlock). In this case while the model predicts
very accurately the age at marriage for men (28.7 years versus 28.9 years in the
data), the model predicts than women will marry 0.5 years later than in the data.
(28.3 versus 27.8 years).
How important is diﬀerential mortality? What is particularly important in the
model is the relative mortality of men and women in a racial group. Figure 13
shows the relative mortality rate for men versus women at each age. Notice that
while the mortality rate of men is greater than the mortality rate of women for
both Blacks and whites, the mortality rate for Black men relative to Black women
is extremely large between ages 16 and 28. 18
How does the higher mortality of Black men eﬀect the marriage market equi-
librium? To analyze this, Figure 14 shows the reservation values for Black men
and women as well as white men and women at each age. Here the same para-
meter values apply to both races but each race is calculated according to their
18It is well known that the fraction of men in federal or state prison or local jails at these ages
is also diﬀerentially high for Black men. Statistics from the Bureau if Justice Statistics suggest
that approximately 9-12% of Black men between ages 18 and 29 are in federal or state prison







































Figure 12: Ratio Single Males/Single Females. US Census 2000 (Blacks) and
Model (k =1 .08,β=0 .93) with mortality rates for blacks.
Model US 2000
(1) (2)
Men Women Men Women
β 0.93
k 1.08
Age of First Marriage 28.7 28.3 28.9 27.8
Average Age of Singles 27.8 29.6 28.9 29.7
Sex Ratio of Singles 0.91 0.82
Ever Married (%) 0.69 0.69 0.58 0.60
Fraction of Singles Over 45 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.13
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.11 0.02 0.08
Average Age of Ever Married 47.9 49.2 46.8 47.2
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.89 0.77
Total Sex Ratio 0.90 0.79



















































Figure 13: Relative Mortality Rates (Males/Females) for Blacks and Whites under
Age 75
own race (and gender) speciﬁc mortality rates. In Figure 14 it is clear that unlike
whites, where the reservation value for men is higher than for women only at
older ages, for Blacks, the reservation value for men is higher than the reservation
for women at all ages. That is, if children within marriage are not very valuable
(relative to outside of marriage), then the relative scarcity of fertile women plays
only a weak role in the market. Conversely, the higher mortality rates for Black
men give them the bargaining power in the market. For that reason, Black men
receive relatively more oﬀers than women reducing their waiting time to marriage
from what it would be with lower mortality. The net result is that Black men and
women tend to marry around the same age.
Figure 15 shows that unlike for white Americans, the ratio of single men to
single women falls below parity at all ages for Black men. Higher male mortality
would seem to almost mechanically cause the sex ratio of single men to single
women to fall below parity (because there are generally fewer men alive than
women). However, white men also have higher mortality than white women.
T h em o r t a l i t yo fw h i t em e ni sn o ts u ﬃciently high relative to white women to
































Figure 14: Reservation Values for Potential Spouses of the Same Age. Model with
k =1 .08,β= .93 and Mortality for Blacks and Whites in 1999.
is limited and children within marriage are valuable (k>1). For whites, the
scarcity of fertile women (driven by limited fecundity) dominates the scarcity of
men (driven by diﬀerential mortality). Thus white women are choosier at young
ages causing young men to wait to marry until the terms of trade change in
their favor (as women’s fecundity declines). Thus for whites, even though male
mortality is greater than female mortality, the sex ratio of single men to single
women remains above parity for much of the life cycle.
Blacks are diﬀerent. Black women face the same scarcity producing eﬀect
of a limited fecundity horizon as white women. However, Black male mortality
is suﬃciently greater than Black female mortality to oﬀset the natural scarcity
women usually enjoy at young ages. With diﬀerentially high Black male mortality,
it is men that are scarce over the entire life cycle. Thus Black men do not face
the same incentives to delay marriage as they do not have growing scarcity over
time (as do white men). For this reason, Black men and women marry at close to
the same age and the fewer Black men that survive mortality end up driving the
sex ratio below parity at all ages. Two factors play a role in making the sex ratios





































Figure 15: Ratio Single Men/Single Women. Model with k =1 .08,β= .93 and
Mortality for Blacks and Whites in 1999.
Black men and second, the fact that Black men do not wait more than women in
order to marry.
The consequence of this behavior is that a larger fraction of Black women
never marry. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, in 2000, 13% of Black women aged 45
and over never married compared to only 5 % of White women. The predictions
of the model is qualitatively similar. However the fraction of women predicted
never to marry are lower for both races (9% for Blacks versus 5% for Whites).19
This ﬁnding is related to the Wilson Hypothesis, although the mechanism
leading to lower marriage rates is diﬀerent. Wilson’s model is typically interpreted
as Black women rejecting Black men (who have made oﬀers) because they do not
bring enough to the marriage (i.e. are not "marriageable" because of poor job
prospects). In my model Black women also delay marriage (or do not marry)
but it is because men reject women. Men reject women because the higher male
mortality makes them scarce and the low value of children within marriage make
women not as valuable to men.
19Remember that for simplicity the model assumes that there is no utility of remaining single.
42Model France 1999
(1) (2)
Men Women Men Women
β 0.925
k 1.25
Age of First Marriage 29.4 27.9 30.2 28.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.13 1.16
Ever Married (%) 0.69 0.74 0.61 0.67
Fraction of Widows 0.07 0.02 0.10
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.90 0.87
Total Sex Ratio 0.96 0.97
Table 3: Comparison Between Model and France Census 1999
5.2. France
Table 3 and Figure 16 compare the model results with the 1999 France census.
Data is from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies - France
for the entire population who lives in metropolitan areas. The model results are
for β =0 .925 and k =1 .25. Notice than in this case the predictions of the model
match quite accurately the data.
5.3. Sweden
Here we compare the model results with data for the year 2000 in Sweden. Data
is form Statistics Sweden for the entire population. The model results are for
β =0 .95 and k =1 .25. Here the model predicts accurately the age at ﬁrst
marriage for men (32.3 years) and women marry in average one year earlier in
the data than when the model results predict (30.1 versus 31.3 years). Thus, the
model predict a smaller age diﬀerence than the actual mean age diﬀerence (1 year
versus 2.3 years).
5.4. US in Previous Decades
Figure 18 shows the median age at ﬁrst marriage in US since 1940. The tendency
to delaying marriage over the last decades is clear. This reﬂects an increase in
































Figure 16: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. Census 1999 (France) and
Model (k =1 .25,β=0 .925) with mortality rates in France.
the mean age at ﬁrst marriage for white males married between 1960 and 1965
was 23.5 years, and 21 years for white females. In 1975-80 the mean for white
males was 23.9 and 21.8 for white females. Note that the age diﬀerence between
men and women appear to be quite stable.20
Figure 19 shows the sex ratio (single males/single females) for whites in the
US for 1960, 1980 and 2000. The age pattern of sex ratios appear to have changed
over time. First, the pattern of the sex ratio by age is ﬂatter in 1980 with respect
to 1960 and even more ﬂat in 2000. Second, the "peak" sex ratio in 1960 and 1980
w a si nt h em i d2 0 ’ s .T h i sp e a km o v e dt ot h em i d3 0 ’ si n2 0 0 0c e n s u s .F i g u r e2 0
shows the pattern of the sex ratio (single males/single females) for blacks in the
US for 1960, 1980 and 2000. As in the case of whites, the pattern appear to have
changed over time. While in 1960 the graphic shows a very similar pattern to the
one for whites, that is not the case for 1980 and 2000.
In the case of 1960, in order to achieve a similar pattern to that of the data
it would be necessary to assume that women’s fecundity starts to decrease at age




Men Women Men Women
β 0.95
k 1.25
Age of First Marriage 32.3 31.3 32.4 30.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.12 1.24
Ever Married (%) 0.64 0.68 0.55 0.64
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.05 0.03 0.08
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.95 0.87
Total Sex Ratio 1.00 1.01





















Figure 17: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. Census 2000 (Sweden) and
Model (k =1 .25,β=0 .95) with mortality rates in Sweden.
4524. This is a signal that this 2 parameter model is not enough in order to explain
the behavior of the marriage market 40 years ago.
The last few decades observed more similar roles for men and women. For ex-
ample, in the US, the level of education have become increasingly similar and
women’s labor participation have increased dramatically in the last 20 years.
Moreover, marriage specialization have consequently decreased21, and traditional
roles in marriage are not so common as they were in the past. Even though social
norms have changed making that roles of men and women became more and
more similar, the fecundity horizon diﬀerences will persist and that can be an
explanation of why women still tend to marry older men.














Figure 18: Median Age at First Marriage in the US
5.5. Developing Countries
Figure 21 shows the sex ratio by age for Kenya and Vietnam in 1999 and Mexico
in 2000. It easy to tell that the data for developed countries match better with
the model that the one for developing countries. Notice than, for these countries
the pattern is very diﬀe r e n tt h a nt h ei nt h ec a s eo ft h eU So rt h eE u r o p e a n









































































Figure 20: Sex Ratio (Single Men/Single Women) in the US (Blacks)
47countries described above. In the three countries of the ﬁgure the sex ratio reaches
a maximum at ages 24-27 and then decreases sharply. This is somewhat similar










































Figure 21: Ratio Single Men/Single Women. Kenya and Vietnam, 1999 and
Mexico 2000
In summary, this model does a better job explaining the patterns in developed
countries than in developing countries, and in recent times compared to previous
decades. In this model the evolution of the sex ratio with age is entirely determined
by the diﬀerent fecundity horizon of men and women. For that reason, all other
diﬀerences between sexes intentionally excluded in this model, obviously also play
a role in marriage behavior. Social norms may also be important. For example,
when we ﬁnd a peak in the sex ratio around 25 years old, as in Figure 21, or the
sharply increase in the sex ratio in the early twenties in US in 1960, perhaps we are
talking about some "social limit" to the age when women should marry. What is
important is that his social norm appear to be more signiﬁcant in societies where
traditional marital roles are still well deﬁned.
486. Conclusion
This paper shows that asymmetric fecundity horizons between men and women
alone are suﬃcient to generate a stylized fact that holds across many societies - on
average younger women marry older men. The 2-parameter model developed to
address this fact also accounts for other stylized facts about the marriage market.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a framework where age of marriage is
determined by biological concerns, ignoring potential gains of specialization. In
the last few decades, men and women have become more alike in their social roles.
Female labor force participation has increased dramatically in many societies and
diﬀerences in education level are disappearing in more developed countries. The
model ﬁts the data well for recent decades in the United States, France and Swe-
den. A second contribution of this work is to show how the eﬀect of asymmetries
in mortality between men and women can aﬀect the structure of the marriage
markets. This plays a particularly important role for Black Americans.
Countries with advanced post-industrial demographics (e.g. France, Sweden
and the U.S.) have ages at ﬁrst marriage and an age pattern of sex ratios that
closely resemble the model’s predictions. In developing countries, however, where
traditional gender roles are still important the model predictions fail to explain
the patterns in the data. This failure suggests that in these contexts the model
is incomplete. Now that we have a better understanding of the role of biology,
one natural extension of this paper is to incorporate features of the labor market
that do vary across countries and over time. Of particular importance are both
the earnings ability of men in a society and the relative earnings ability of men
versus women. This model is designed to incorporate these extensions.
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Figure 22:


























By deﬁnition, p ∈ [0.5,1] and q ∈ [0.5,1]. Diﬀerentiating (38) and (38) we see

























Now, using the condition in (5), it is easy to show that the intercepts are
T1 (0) = (1 + p(k − 1))η




<y m a x
T1 (ymax)=( 1 − p)η
mβx ≥ 0
T2(xmax)=
βηf (1 − q)y
k
≥ 0
The above conditions, summarized in the ﬁgure, rule out any corner solution
and at the same time guarantee the existence of at least one interior solution.
















mβ [(1 − p)+kp(1 − Gm (T2 (R
m
old)))]x
To ensure uniqueness, we need a ﬁxed point of H (.). Thus, we need to show
that H (Rm
old) is a contraction mapping. that is
kH (R
m







where 0 <δ < 1




















Using (2), (3)(4), (38), (39)and the assumption that m1 = f1, substituting




























≤ 1,t h a t
m1
M ≤ 1 and that β<1.
Hence, it will be suﬃcient for H0 (Rm















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
By the assumption above, Gf (.)=Gm(.). First, by (11) and (12),a n du s i n g
(2),(3) and (4), we deﬁne the diﬀerence between reservation values of men and
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k2(1 + β)M
52For k =1 , we know that men and women face exactly the same problem. Then
Rm = Rf,h 1 = w1 and m2 = f2.By the proof of Theorem 1 also Rm












Hence, Rm >R f if k>1, which completes the proof
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